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Abstract
Productivity has recently slowed down in many economies around the world. A
crucial challenge in understanding what lies behind this “productivity puzzle” is the
still short time span for which data can be analysed. An exception is Italy, where
productivity growth started to stagnate 25 years ago. The Italian case can therefore
offer useful insights to understand the global productivity slowdown. We find that
resource misallocation has played a sizeable role in slowing down Italian productivity
growth. If misallocation had remained at its 1995 level, in 2013 Italy’s aggregate
productivity would have been 18% higher than its actual level. Misallocation has
mainly risen within sectors than between them, increasing more in sectors where the
world technological frontier has expanded faster. Relative specialization in those
sectors explains the patterns of misallocation across geographical areas and firm size
classes. The broader message is that an important part of the explanation of the
productivity puzzle may lie in the rising difficulty of reallocating resources across
firms within sectors where technology is changing faster rather than between sectors
with different speeds of technological change.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, many advanced economies have experienced a serious productivity
slowdown. As Figure 1 shows, in the US, the Eurozone and the UK, total factor produc-
tivity is still below the pre-global financial crisis level. Moreover, in 2016 in the US labor
productivity growth fell into negative territory for the first time in the last three decades
(Conference Board, 2016). Productivity has reached the headlines of global media, which
have started focusing on “The productivity puzzle that baﬄes the world’s economies”.1
These trends are particularly worrisome because productivity lies at the heart of long-term
growth.
A crucial challenge in understanding what lies behind this productivity puzzle is the
still short time span for which data can be analysed. As Fernald (2014) and Cette et al.
(2016) point out, in some countries like the US, the productivity slowdown dates back a
few years before the crisis. However, in Italy this is a much longer standing issue. Figure
2 shows a growth accounting decomposition for Italy over the past four decades and the
results are quite emblematic. TFP growth shrank throughout the decades, becoming
negative in the 2000s. Italy turned from being among the fastest growing EU economies
into the “sleeping beauty of Europe”, a country rich in talent and history but suffering
from a long-lasting stagnation (Hassan and Ottaviano, 2013). TFP dynamics in the
manufacturing sector, where measurement issues are less binding than in services, captures
well the timing of the Italian decline. Figure 3 shows a dramatic slowdown in TFP growth
since the mid-Nineties for Italy compared to France and Germany, where TFP continued
to grow up to the global financial crisis.2
The relatively long time-series dimension that characterises the Italian productivity
slowdown makes Italy a relevant case-study for analysing the key features of the produc-
tivity decline (and draw policy recommendations) that can be of general interest to other
countries. We analyse the firm-level dimension of aggregate productivity and focus on the
concept of resource “misalocation” and its impact on productivity. The “productivity”
we refer to is Total Factor Productivity (henceforth, simply TFP), which measures how
effectively given amounts of productive factors (capital and labor) are used. Clearly the
economy’s aggregate TFP depends on its firms’ TFP. This happens along two dimensions.
On the one hand, for given amounts of factors used by each firm, aggregate TFP grows
when individual firm TFP grows, for example thanks to the adoption of better tech-
nologies and management practices. If market imperfections prevent firms from seizing
these opportunities, the economy’s productive apparatus is exposed to obsolescence and
senescence with adverse effects on aggregate TFP.
On the other hand, for given individual firm-level TFP, aggregate TFP depends
on how factors are allocated across firms. As long as market frictions “distort” the
allocation of product demand and factor supply away from high TFP firms towards low
TFP firms, they lead to lower aggregate TFP than in an ideal situation of frictionless
1The Financial Times, 29th May, 2016.
2In the paper we focus on firms in the manufacturing sector, because firm-level TFP measurement is
less controversial than in services due to better accounting of the capital stock. We have run the same
analysis also for firms in the service sector and the results are very similar.
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markets. Building on the distinction, introduced by Foster et al. (2008) between physical
TFP (TFPQ or simply TFP, i.e., measured as the ability to generate physical output from
given inputs) and revenue TFP (TFPR, i.e., measured as the ability to generate revenue
from given inputs), Hsieh and Klenow (2009) - henceforth HK - construct a model of
monopolistic competition in which, although firms can differ in their physical TFP, in the
absence of frictions TFPR is the same for all firms. The idea behind this result is simple:
with no frictions, the marginal revenue product of inputs should be equalized across firms
as factors move from low to high marginal revenue product firms. As marginal revenue
product equalization implies TFPR equalization, HK call deviations from a situation in
which TFPR is equalized “misallocation”, and propose a simple way to measure its effect
on aggregate TFP. This is also the definition of “misallocation” we adopt. It implies that
the dispersion of TFPR across firms can be used to measure the extent of misallocation.
It also implies that firms with a TFPR higher than the sectoral average are inefficiently
small, while those with a TFPR below the sectoral average are inefficiently large. These
are the two key implications of the misallocation literature that we use in this paper.
With these definitions in mind, we study the universe of Italian incorporated compa-
nies over the period 1993-2013 and find strong evidence of increased misallocation since
1995. If misallocation had remained at its 1995 level, in 2013 aggregate TFP would
have been 18% higher than its current level. This would have translated into 1% higher
GDP growth per-year, which would have helped to close the growth gap with France and
Germany.
We then present a decomposition of misallocation into within- and between-group
components, with firms grouped according to the sector, the geographical area and the
size class. This analysis shows that the main source of misallocation comes from the
within component: misallocation has mainly risen within sectors rather than between
them, within geographical areas rather than between them, within different size classes
rather than between them.
To shed light on this result, we consider the relationship at the sectoral level between
the estimated within-sector component of misallocation and the sectoral speed of tech-
nological change. Following Griffith et al. (2004), we proxy the speed of technological
change with the increase in sectoral R&D intensity (R&D expenditure over value added)
in advanced countries over the period 1987-2007. The positive and significant correlation
that we find entails that misallocation seems to have increased more in sectors where
the world technological frontier has expanded faster. Once we account for the sectoral
composition of Italian macro-regions and firm size classes, the implied “frontier shocks”
are the strongest for Northern regions and big firms, thus matching the relatively higher
increase in misallocation estimated for those classes of firms, which are traditionally the
driving forces of the Italian economy.
Finally, we analyze a number of firm characteristics (i.e., ‘markers’) potentially asso-
ciated with firms being inefficiently sized. In particular, we consider corporate ownership
and management, finance, workforce composition, internationalization and innovation.
We find that the firms that employ a larger share of graduates or invest more in intan-
gible assets are inefficiently small and thus under-resourced. These are likely to be the
firms keeping up with the technological frontier. On the contrary, the firms that have a
large share of workers under the Italian wage supplementation scheme, that are family
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managed, or financially constrained, are inefficiently large and thus over-resourced. These
firms are less likely to be keeping up with technological progress. We interpret this as ev-
idence that rising within-industry misallocation is consistent with a heterogeneous ability
of firms to respond to sectoral “frontier shocks” in the presence of sluggish reallocation
of resources.
The broader message we draw from the above results is that an important part of
the explanation of the recent productivity puzzle may lie in a generally rising difficulty
of reallocating resources between firms in sectors where technology is changing faster
rather than between sectors with different speeds of technological change. This implies
that moving factors of production from traditional, e.g. ‘textile’, into IT sectors would
increase aggregate productivity less than ensuring that the most efficient firms within the
textile sector are the ones that absorb more resources.
A concern with our quantification exercise relates to the caveats associated to mea-
sure of misallocation of HK. For instance Asker et al. (2014) argue that, in the presence
of adjustment costs in investment (“time-to-build”), transitory idiosyncratic TFP shocks
across firms naturally generate dispersion in productivity without this implying ineffi-
ciency. From a different angle, De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) and Haltiwanger (2016)
argue that if firms had the same TFP but different initial market power due to demand
characteristics, convergence of market power to the top would reduce TFPR dispersion but
could be hardly considered an improvement in efficiency. Finally, Bils et al. (2017) stress
the role of mismeasurement in the calculation of misallocation and propose a methodology
to assess its impact. We show that our results are robust to these issues and that the
caveats charcterising the HK concept of misallocation are unlikely to drive our results.
Our work relates to a number of studies that have used the framework of HK to
measure the extent of misallocation in various countries, such as Bellone and Mallen-
Pisano (2013), Bollard et al. (2013), Ziebarth (2013), Chen and Irarrazabal (2014),
Crespo and Segura-Cayuela (2014), Dias et al. (2014), Garcia-Santana et al. (2016),
Gamberoni et al. (2016) and Gopinath et al. (2017). Our paper is closer in spirit to
Garcia-Santana et al. (2016), who analyze the patterns of misallocation for Spain, and
to Gamberoni et al. (2016), who look at the evolution of misallocation across European
countries.
Our paper is also related to studies that have analysed more specifically the issue
of the Italian productivity slowdown since the 1990s, such as Faini and Sapir (2005),
Barba-Navaretti et al. (2010), Bugamelli et al. (2010), Bugamelli et al. (2012), Lusinyan
e Muir (2013), Michelacci and Schivardi (2013), De Nardis (2014), Lippi and Schivardi
(2014), Bandiera et al. (2015), Calligaris (2015), Daveri and Parisi (2015), Linarello and
Petrella (2016) and Calligaris et al. (2016), Pellegrino and Zingales (2017) and Schivardi
and Schmitz (2018). Our contribution is to focus more specifically on the role of resource
misallocation and its impact on productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the methodological
approach. Section 3 presents the main features of the database. Section 4 reports our
aggregate findings on productivity and misallocation. Section 5 analyzes the role of the
increase in R&D intensity. Section 6 looks at idiosyncratic firm shocks and the cyclical
behavior of misallocation. Section 7 estimates the impact of misallocation on aggregate
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TFP. Section 8 discusses the robustness of our findings to the limitations of the Hsieh-
Klenow framework. Section 9 discusses the markers of misallocated firms. Section 10
concludes.
2 Measuring misallocation
We follow HK in defining ‘misallocation’ as an inefficient allocation of productive
factors (labor and capital) across firms with different TFP (see the Appendix for details).3
Inefficiency is defined with respect to the ideal allocation of factors that would result in a
world of frictionless product and factor markets where consumers are free to spend their
income on the firms quoting the lowest prices and owners of productive factors are free
to supply the firms offering the highest remunerations. In this ideal allocation the value
of the marginal product (‘marginal revenue product’; henceforth MRP) of each factor is
equalized across firms so that the factor’s remuneration is the same for all firms. This is
an equilibrium as consumers have no incentive to change their spending decision, firms
have no incentive to change their production decisions and factor owners have no incentive
to change the provision of their services. It is also a stable equilibrium as any exogenous
shock creating gaps in a factor’s MRP across firms would trigger a reallocation of that
factor from low to high MRP firms until its remuneration is again equalized across all
firms.
Shocks that can create such gaps are idiosyncratic shocks that increase the TFP
of some firms relative to others. As firms with higher MRPs after the shocks are able
to offer higher factor remunerations at the pre-shocks equilibrium allocation, they have
the opportunity to expand their operations by attracting additional factor services away
from less productive firms until convergence in factors’ MRPs restores the equalisation
of factor remuneration across firms in the new post-shocks equilibrium. In this respect,
observed gaps in factors’ MRPs across firms reveal ‘distorted’ factor allocation across them
as factors are inefficiently used. This inefficient allocation of resources is what HK call
‘misallocation’ and its extent can be measured by the width of the observed gaps (‘wedges’)
in factors’ MRPs between firms. It implies that, though offering higher remunerations,
more productive firms are not able to attract the factors they would need to grow and
thus remain inefficiently small. Vice versa, though offering lower remunerations, less
productive firms are inefficiently large.
The dispersions of marginal revenue products map into the dispersion of ‘revenue
TFP’ (TFPR). Under the HK assumptions more dispersion of TFPR is, in turn, associated
with more inefficient allocation and lower welfare (‘misallocation’).4 If we use TFPRsi
to denote the TFPR of firm i in sector s and TFPRs to denote the sectoral average,
then TFPRsi/TFPRs > 1 implies that the firm is inefficiently small and should be
3The only quantitative results from HK we will use are those on the computation of TFPR and
factors’ marginal revenue products. As these follow standard textbook definitions, we provide here only
a qualitative discussion of the logic of the HK approach, referring interested readers to the Appendix for
additional details.
4As discussed in the Introduction, this is not necessarily the case when markups vary across firms
(Asker et al., 2014), or firms incur adjustment costs in reacting to idiosyncratic shocks (De Loecker and
Goldberg, 2014; Haltiwanger, 2016).
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allocated more inputs in order to be able to increase its output and decrease its price
until TFPRsi/TFPRs = 1. Conversely, TFPRsi/TFPRs < 1 implies that the firm is
inefficiently large and should be allocated less inputs in order to be able to decrease its
output and increase its price until TFPRsi/TFPRs = 1. The dispersion of TFPRsi
around TFPRs has a direct impact on sectoral TFP as the latter can be expressed
in terms of the ideal level of sectoral TFP that would be achieved under the efficient
allocation of resources minus the observed variance of firm TFPR in the actual allocation.5
The extent misallocation in the economy can be measured in terms of aggregate
TFPR dispersion as a weighted average of the sectoral misallocations, with the weights
expressed in terms of sectoral value added (VA) shares with resepct to the total economy
V ar(TFPR) =
S∑
s=1
V As
V A
Ns∑
i=1
V Asi
V As
(TFPRsi − TFPRs)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ar(TFPRs)
(1)
where Ns is the number of firms in sector s and S is the number of sectors. This is the
expression we use to measure aggregate misallocation for the economy.6
We are also interested in understanding the extent to which aggregate dispersion is
driven by variations between and within geographical areas or firm size classes. Using g
to denote an area/size group, TFPRgsi will refer to the TFPR of firm i in sector s and
area/size group g and Ngs to the number of firms in that sector and group. Aggregate
TFPR dispersion in the economy can then be decomposed into within-group and between-
group components as
V ar(TFPR) =
G∑
g=1
V Ag
V A
S∑
s=1
V Ags
V Ag
Ngs∑
i=1
V Agsi
V Ags
(TFPRgsi − TFPRgs)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ar(TFPR)gs︸ ︷︷ ︸
V ar(TFPR)g︸ ︷︷ ︸
WITHIN-GROUP
+
+
G∑
g=1
V Ag
V A
S∑
s=1
V Ags
V Ag
(TFPRgs − TFPR)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
BETWEEN-GROUP
(2)
where G is the number of area/size groups. In (2) the overall TFPR variance is decom-
posed in two parts: a weighted average of the within-group squared deviations from the
group mean, and a weighted average of the squared deviations of the group means from
the overall mean. Specifically, the within-group component represents a weighted average
of the group-specific variances, in turn expressed in terms of weighted averages of the
variance within the sector-specific TFPR distributions in the group.
5 For our purposes it is conceptually crucial to measure TFPR based on cost shares as in HK rather
from the residual of a firm-level production function estimation as in the productivity literature in IO
(Foster et al., 2017).
6The same measure is used by HK (2009), although they do not weight across units (i.e. the shares
V Asi/V As). Thus, compared to HK, our measure assigns more importance to misallocation in larger
firms.
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When the economy is considered a single area/size group (so that the number of
groups is equal to one), the within-group component in 2 boils down to 1, that is to
a simple within-sector component, consisting of a weighted average of the within-sector
variances.
3 Data description
We use two main databases. The first - CERVED - covers the universe of incorporated
companies, with information from firms’ balance sheets that we use in Sections 4 and to
study the evolution of aggregate misallocation. The second - INVIND - is a panel of
representative Italian manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees, with more detailed
information on firms’ characteristics that we use in Section 9 to analyze the firm-level
markers of misallocation. We group manufacturing firms into 3-digit sectors using the
ATECO 2002 classification, which allows us to distinguish detailed categories such as
‘machines for producing mechanic energy’, ‘machines for agriculture’, ‘tooling machines’,
‘machines for general use’, etc.7
CERVED accounts for 70% of manufacturing value added from national accounts
and the trend rate follows very closely the national one. In order to compute firm-level
measures of TFPR as in HK, we need measures of output as well as of labor and capital
inputs. We measure the labor input using the cost of labor and the capital stock using
the book value of fixed capital net of depreciation, while we take firms’ value added as a
measure of the total revenue of the model as this does not consider intermediate inputs.
All variables are deflated through sector-specific deflators (with base year 2007). We clean
the database from outliers by dropping all observations with negative values for real value
added, cost of labor or capital stock. We are left with a pooled sample of 1,740,000 firm-
year observations for manufacturing over the period 1993–2013. The average number of
observations per firm is 12. To compute firm-level TFPR we also need capital and labor
shares at industry level. We compute the labor share by taking the industry mean of
labor expenditure on value added measured at the firm level. We then set the capital
share as one minus the computed labor share.
INVIND is the Bank of Italy’s annual “Survey of Industrial and Service Firms”. The
survey contains detailed information on firm revenues, ownership, production factors,
year of creation and number of employees since 1984. In order to analyse the firm-level
features of misallocation, the INVIND data are matched with those from ‘Centrale dei
Bilanci’, a representative sample with more detailed information on firms’ characteristics.
‘Centrale dei Bilanci’ contains balance sheet data on around 30,000 Italian firms and is
matched with ‘Centrale dei Bilanci’ using the tax identification number of firms. We
drop observations pre–1987, in order to have a proper sample coverage, as well as those
not matched. We are left with a pooled sample of 19,924 firm-year observations over
the 25-year period 1987–2011, with an average of 11 observations per firm. We divide
the INVIND panel in low-tech and high-tech sectors using the OECD classification of
7The total number of 3-digit sectors is 91. We also use a classification at 2-digit and 4-digit and results
hold. We exclude ‘coke and petroleum products’ and ‘other manufacturing n.e.c.’ from manufacturing.
These sectors have peculiar behaviors, whose study lies outside the scope of this paper.
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manufacturing industries according to their global technological intensity, based on R&D
expenditures respect to value added and production.8
Table 1 presents sectoral descriptive statistics from CERVED at 2-digits for average
real value added, capital stock and cost of labor over the period of observation, both in
absolute terms and in percentages with respect to the total.9 The sectors ‘machinery’,
‘metals’ and ‘textile and leather’ are the sectors with the largest numbers of firms and
represent 62% of the total number of manufacturing firms. Real value added ranges from
a mean of around 0.8m Euro in ‘wood’ to around 4.4m Euro in ‘vehicles’. Variation in
the average capital stock is sizable, ranging from around 1m Euro in ‘textile and leather’
to around 4.9m Euro in ‘vehicles’. The cost of labor varies notably too, ranging between
0.5m Euro in ‘wood’ and 3.2m Euro in ‘vehicles’.
In order to better understand the evolution of misallocation, we divide the dataset
into geographic and firm size cells. In particular, we group firms within each industry
into four macro-areas: Northwest, Northeast, Center, South-Islands.10 We also divide the
firms in the dataset into four groups according to their size: ‘micro’, ‘small’, ‘medium’
and ‘big’.11 We report the summary statistics of the main variables divided by geographic
area and size, both in absolute terms and percentages, in Table 2. Around two thirds
of manufacturing firms are located in the Northern areas of the country. In these areas,
manufacturing firms’ value added, capital stock and cost of labor are higher than the
average. Looking at firm size, more than 88% of manufacturing firms are ‘micro’ or
‘small’, while only 2.2% are ‘big’. However, ‘micro’ and ‘small’ firms account for only
around 30% of total value added and input costs, whereas big firms account for around
45%.
In Table 3 we present the summary statistics of firms clustered by sector-area and
by sector-size. For most of the industries the majority of firms are located in the North.
Moreover, practically all sectors are composed mainly by ‘micro’ and ‘small’ firms, with
the majority of bigger manufacturing firms concentrated in ‘chemicals’, ‘food and tobacco’
and ‘vehicles industries’. Table 4 shows the relevance of firm size by geographic area. In
the Northwest more than half of the value added in manufacturing comes from ‘big’ firms.
Finally, Table 5 looks at the distribution of value added by firm size across geographical
8High-tech industries include firms that produce office, accounting and computing machines; radio,
TV and communication equipment; aircraft and spacecraft; medical, precision and optical instruments;
electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers; chemicals excluding
pharmaceuticals; rail-road equipment and transport equipment n.e.c.; and machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Low-tech industries account for firms that work in building and repairing of ships and boats; rubber and
plastic products; other non-metallic mineral products; basic metals and fabricated metal products; wood,
pulp, paper; paper products; printing and publishing; food products; beverage and tobacco; textiles; and
leather and footwear.
9We present the descriptive statistics for 2-digit sectors for ease of exposition, but the quantitative
analysis is at 3-digit level.
10We use the ISTAT (National institute of Statistics) classification of macro-areas. “Northwest” includes
the regions Liguria, Lombardy, Piedmont and Aosta Valley; “Northeast” includes Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia, Trentino-South Tyrol and Veneto; “Center” includes Lazio, Marche, Tuscany and Umbria;
“South and Islands” includes Abruzzi, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Apulia, Sicily and Sardinia.
11We use the European Commission classification of firms according to their turnover. “Micro” are
firms with a turnover < 2m Euros, “small” < 10m Euros, “medium” < 50m Euros, “big” > 50m Euros.
See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/sme-definition/index_en.
htm.
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areas. About 56% of value added produced by big firms in the manufacturing sector
comes from the Northwest, this confirms a strong overlap between the Northwest region
and big firms.
4 The patterns of aggregate misallocation
We first investigate the misallocation pattern in the manufacturing sector by com-
puting the TFPR variance as described in Equation (1). The output of this exercise
(in logs) is depicted in Figure 4, where we also report the average TFPR based on the
same weighting scheme used for the variance. The figure shows that a large decline in
average TFPR occurred in the mid-nineties, followed by a temporary recovery from 2005
to 2007 and a new fall associated with the economic crisis with a drop of about -10.5%.
Moreover, aggregate misallocation (as measured by the variance of TFPR) steadily and
steeply increased between 1995 and 2009 and slightly decreased after its peak in 2009.
However, aggregate misallocation increased by almost 69% between 1995 and 2013 with
most of the increase taking place in the first decade.12
Figure 5, shows quite clearly that the evolution of TFPR highlighted above (i.e.
decreasing average and increasing variance) mainly occurred through a rising share of low
productivity firms. When the comparison is made, instead, between 2007 and 2013 (see
Figure 5), the difference in the share of low productivity firms is much less pronounced.
In fact, recalling what we have seen in Figure 4, 2007 represents a critical year for average
TFPR but not for its variance as this grows until 2009. Figure 6 shows the evolution of
aggregate misallocation, captured by the variance of TFPR over the full sample of firms
per-year. We can see that misallocation raised sharply from 1995 to 2009, when it started
a process of slow reversion. This suggests that the aggregate decrease in TFPR occurred
in the last years compounds a long-run increase in misallocation with a crisis-related
fall in average firm productivity. Interestingly, misallocation stopped increasing after the
global financial crisis. This is probably due to some cleansing effect of the crisis, as firms
in the lowest percentiles of the productivity distribution are much more likely to exit the
market after the crisis than in previous years.13
In principle, the increasing misallocation pattern documented in the aggregate might
hide substantial differences across sectors, areas and firm size categories. However, before
going into the details of each dimension, we implement the decomposition in Equation
(2) in order to understand to what extent aggregate misallocation can be traced back
to differences in terms of TFPR dispersion across the categories. In Figure 7 we report
the computed within and between components of aggregate TFPR variance for the three
dimensions, along the whole period under consideration (1993–2013). The message is
clear-cut as the between component is always small compared with the within component
with only slight differences emerging across the three dimensions (see Figures 8 and 9).
12In order to have some insight about the trend of misallocation before 1993, we also use the INVIND
database which starts in 1987–2011, but accounts for a more limited sample of firms above 50 employees.
This longer database confirms that the rise of misallocation is a phenomenon that started in the mid-’90s
and it was not a previously undergoing trend. In INVIND misallocation has a similar trend with respect
to CERVED, although the raise starts a couple of years later in 1997 and is quantitatively stronger.
13Details available upon request.
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Moreover, since the between components start growing only after 2000, the increase in
aggregate variance occurred between 1995 and 2000 is almost entirely driven by the within
components. We wonder whether this pattern is driven by firms’ entry and exit, so in
Figure 10 we report the evolution of within misallocation for firms that are always in our
data set (balanced panel) and for the full sample that accounts also for entry and exit.
Even if the level of misallocation is lower for the balanced panel, the trend of misallocation
is qualitatively very similar in both samples. However, from a quantitative point of view,
after 1995 misallocation increases more significantly for the balanced panel than for the
full sample; this implies that, if anything, the process of entry and exit is dampening
the raise of misallocation, which is consistent with the findings of Linarello and Petrella
(2016).
As shown by HK, TFPR is proportional to the geometric average of the marginal
product of capital (MRPK) and labor (MRPL). Hence the dispersion of TFPR and our
measure of misallocation are going to be proportional to MRPK and MRPL. Figure 11
reports the patterns of MRPK and MRPL dispersion. Capital is the factor of production
that experiences the sharpest increase in its marginal product’s dispersion since the mid-
1990s, although the pattern has flattened out since the global financial crisis. To some
extent the dispersion of MRPL increased too, but it does not show a striking trend.14
This seems to suggest that the capital market is a very important source of misallocation
in Italy.
5 Insights from regional and size patterns
To better understand the geographical distribution of misallocation, we report in Figure
12 the evolution of misallocation within macro-regions (i.e., the term V ar(TFPR)g in
Equation (2). We note that misallocation in the Northwest and the Center grew at a
considerably higher rate, compared to the other areas; misallocation in the South was
higher than in the rest of Italy at the beginning of the period but, being quite stable
over time, ends up being lower than in the North at the end of the period.15. The same
analysis can be carried out in terms of firm size categories (see Figure 13). This exercise
shows that, while misallocation grew in all size classes, a steeper increase is reported for
the big firms class, which faced the lowest degree of misallocation 1995 and turns to be
the group with the highest level of misallocation towards the end of the period.
These results are surprising because firms in the Northwest region and bigger firms
are traditionally more advanced and closer to the technological frontier. This suggests
a possible explanation of raise of misallocation: for given level of frictions, the shocks
hitting firms have become more dispersed; this might be the result of a fast changing
technological frontier (due for instance to the IT revolution, see Schivardi and Schmitz
2018). To explore this possibility we build on Griffith et al. (2004). As a proxy of shocks to
the technology frontier by sector, we take the change of R&D intensity between the period
14If we look at the change of the distribution of MRPK and MRPL between 1995 and 2013, we see that
MRPK experienced a fattening of both tails and it kept a very similar mean; whereas, the distribution
of MRPL experienced a clear leftward shift with a significant decrease of the mean. Results are available
upon request.
15To save on space, we do not show the graphs of group-specific distributions, but they support this
finding.
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1993-2007 and 1987-1992. We measure R&D intensity as the share of R&D expenditure to
value added at the 2-digit sectoral level in advanced countries other than Italy.16 Figure
14 plots the correlation between the change of misallocation over our sample period and
the change of R&D intensity described above. The correlation is positive and significative,
such that an increase of one standard deviation of R&D intensity growth is associated
with a 0.14 standard deviation increase of misallocation growth (statistically significant
at the 1% level). Moreover, we compute the implied “frontier shocks” at the regional
level, by taking the weighted average of the sectoral changes in R&D intensity. It turns
out that the “frontier shock” is higher in the Northwest (4.6%) and the Center (5.1%)
and lower in the Northeast (3.1%) and the South (2.2%). This follows the region and size
patterns of misallocation highlighted above. 17
An implication of this result is that firms in the upper part of the productivity distri-
bution should be those that contribute more to the overall increase in misallocation. We
find that the standard deviation of log TFPR is about 0.4 for firms in the top quartile
of the productivity distribution and it is increasing over time. Whereas, for firms in the
2nd and 3rd quartile misallocation is slightly increasing after the crisis, but its level is
low (0.1). Finally for firms in the bottom quartile, the dispersion if higher (0.6), but it is
stable up to the crisis and then decreases. Therefore, the dispersion across the firms that
are in the top quartile of the distribution is the one that contributes the most to the rise
of aggregate misallocation.
**FH. Tagliamo paragrafo e figura? Alla fine questo passaggio risulta sle-
gato dalla sezione. The productivity thresholds of firms entry and exit do not exhibit
a particular trend, but they are subject to standard year-to-year oscillation. On average,
firms that enter a market are 20% more productive than the average firm in that sector,
whereas firms that exit the market are 40% less productive than the average firm (Figure
15). This suggests that movements of the cut-off for firms entry and exit are unlikely to
drive the rise of misallocation, which is actually the result of increased dispersion in the
top quartile of the distribution.
6 Idiosyncratic shocks and the cyclical behaviour of misal-
location
The raise of the dispersion of TFPR across firms that we highlight could be driven by an
increase in the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks that firms face. To investigate this issue
we measure the idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ TFPR following Gopinath et al. (2017).
We assume that firms’ productivity is the product of an aggregate effect, a permanent
firm level effect, and an idiosyncratic transitory effect, which depends on past TFPR and
16The countries we consider are Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Results hold also if we take R&D intensity in the
United States only. Data are from the ANBERD database of the OECD.
17Interestingly, these results are unlikely to be linked to the raise of international competition. Firstly,
as Griffith et al. (2004) show, import penetration has no significant effect on innovation. Secondly, we
have looked at the effect of sectoral exposure to the raise of China after its access to the WTO, using
an indicator similar to Autor. et al. 2014. We find no relation between sectoral exposure to China and
increase in misallocation.
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an idiosyncratic shock. More specifically we consider:
ln TFPRist = γi + δst + β ln TFPRist−1 + uist (3)
where γi captures the firm permanent component, δst is an industry-year fixed effect
that denotes the aggregate component of firm productivity, and uist is the residual that
captures the idiosyncratic shock that firms face.
In Figure 16 we show the dispersion of the residuals estimated from Equation 3. We
find that there is no increase in the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks between 1995 and
2000. This means that, at least initially, the raise in misallocation that we observe since
1995 is unlikely to be driven by a higher dispersion of firm-level shocks. Nonetheless, we
see an increase in the dispersion of shocks in the period 2000-2002 and then in 2008-2009.
The former is associated to a sharp slowdown in GDP growth (from 3.7% to 0.2%), the
latter with the recession due to the global financial crisis.
Interestingly, there is no significant raise in the dispersion of idiosyncratic shocks after
the European debt crisis of 2011, although the level of the dispersion remains higher than
the pre-2008 period. Moreover, as we observed in Figure 6, the level of misallocation
decreases slightly after the European debt crisis. This could be due to some cleansing
effect that this crisis had. Figure 17 shows the exit rate of firms by productivity decile:
before the European crisis (i.e., before 2007), after the global financial crisis (i.e., after
2009) and after the European sovereign debt crisis (i.e., after 2012). The results show
that, for firms in the lowest deciles, the exit rate increases significantly after the European
crisis, but not after the global financial crisis. This provides suggestive evidence of some
cleansing effect following the European crisis.
7 The impact of misallocation on aggregate productivity
The overarching message of the evidence presented in the previous sections is that overall
the stagnation of Italian productivity since the 1990’s has been accompanied by a steady
increase in misallocation. We now quantify the impact that the increase in misalloca-
tion had on aggregate TFP during our period of observation. In particular, we want to
understand how much aggregate TFP in 2013 would have changed if misallocation had
remained constant at the 1995 level.
Following HK, we proceed as follows. First, in each year t from 1995 to 2013 we
evaluate the increase in aggregate output that could be achieved by completely eliminating
misallocation (i.e. by reallocating productive factors so as to equalize their remunerations
across all firms). In any given year, within the HK framework that increase is dictated by
the ratio between the observed aggregate output level Y and the efficient aggregate output
level Y ∗ in the absence of gaps in factor remunerations. We can, therefore, evaluate the
percentage increase in aggregate productivity that could have been achieved in any year
t by completely eliminating misallocation as:
% Gaint =
(
Yt
Y ∗t
)−1
− 1 (4)
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Second, to understand how much aggregate productivity in year t would have changed
if misallocation had remained constant at the 1995 level, we can look at the percentage
relative change in the efficient-to-observed output ratios in the two years:
% Gaint/95 =
(
Yt/Y
∗
t
Y95/Y ∗95
)−1
− 1 (5)
When applied to our data, equation (5) implies that, if misallocation had remained
at its 1995 level, in 2013 aggregate productivity would have been 18% higher than its
actual level (see Figure 18). Moreover, the effect of misallocation on productivity peaked
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis leading to a 23% foregone productivity
gain, but weakened slightly after the Euro-debt crisis. So, even after netting out the spike
in the productivity penalty of misallocation associated with the crisis, the adverse effects
of misallocation on Italian productivity remain sizeable.18
From a size class (Figure 19) and geographical perspective (Figure 20), the observed
patterns are mainly driven by misallocation across big firms and by firms in the Northwest.
In fact, in the cases of big firms and the Northwest, productivity would have been 18%
and 25% higher if misallocation in 2013 had stayed at its 1995 level.
8 Caveats of the Hsieh-Klenow framework: a robustness
analysis
Even if the measure of misallocation of HK is extensively used in the literature, there are
important caveats to keep in mind. For instance, the very idea of interpreting the entire
observed dispersion of TFPR across firms as evidence of inefficiency is contentious. Asker
et al. (2014) argue that, in the presence of adjustment costs in investment (“time-to-
build”), transitory idiosyncratic TFP shocks across firms naturally generate dispersion of
the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK). In this case, as long as adjustment costs
are determined by technological factors, the dispersion of MRPK is an efficient outcome
and thus the observed gaps (“wedges”) in MRPK should not be taken as evidence of
any misallocation. In this respect, HK neglect the distinction between technology-driven
adjustment costs, such as the natural time needed to build a new plant, and wasteful
frictions, such as the bureaucratic procedures of authorisation that may delay the con-
struction and activation of a new plant. In order to explore whether time to build can be
a driver of our findings, we explore the stationarity of our firm-level misallocation mea-
sure ln
(
TFPRis/TFPRs
)
. The idea is that this ratio should converge towards one over
time if the adjustment process after a TFP shock is the main driver of TFPR dispersion.
Firstly, we consider the variance ratio statistics (Cochrane, 1988; Engel, 2000), defined as
V ar(Xt+k−Xt)/V ar(Xt+1−Xt), where X denotes the average of the relative log-TFPR
(i.e., ln TFPRsit
TFPRst
). For stationary series, the variance ratio approaches a limit. The output
18The quantitative results of this exercise are sensitive to the values chosen for the elasticity of substitu-
tion σ between products sold by firms. In the baseline we set σ equal to 3 as in HK. This is a conservative
value also in light of Broda and Weinstein (2006) who find that for SITC-3 digits the average value of the
elasticity of substitution after 1990 is about 4. Higher values of the elasticity deliver stronger gains: 12%
with σ = 2, and 19% with σ = 4.
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of this exercise is reported in Figure 21. The pattern suggests that the variation in firm-
level misallocation tends to stabilise in a time horizon of around fifteen years, which is a
too long period for being consistent with an adjustment cost story. We also run a series
of unit root tests to investigate the mean reversion property of this ratio. Table 6 reports
the the Im-Pesaran-Shin (Im et al., 2003) and the Fisher-type (Choi, 2001) tests for the
presence of unit root. The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases, entailing the series to
be stationary and firms’ relative TFPR not being mean reverting.19
From a different angle, De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) and Haltiwanger (2016)
argue that a reduction in the observed wedges does not necessarily imply more market
efficiency. For example, if firms had the same TFP but different initial market power
due to demand characteristics, convergence of market power to the top would reduce
TFPR dispersion but could be hardly considered an improvement in efficiency. Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008) show that in the case of linear demand, markup is increasing with
size (the elasticity of demand is decresing with size). Therefore, if heterogenous markups
drive dispersion, we should observe that TFPR increases with size. However, in Figure
22, where we report the average TFPR by size percentile, we find that there is no clear
relation between TFPR and size.20 Moreover, as Gopinath et al.(2017) stress, if markups
drive dispersion, the effect should be symmetric for capital and labor and we should
observe proportional increases in the dispersion of both MRPK and MRPL. As shown in
Figure 11, this is not the case: dispersion increases more for capital.21
Finally, another source of concern is related to measurement error in firms’ revenues
and inputs. As Bils et al. (2017) point out, this is likely to distort the misallocation
analysis. In fact, a firm’s TFPR is higher when revenues are overstated and/or inputs are
understated: if, for example, the extent of revenue overstatement (input understatement)
systematically grows (shrinks) with firms’ true revenues (inputs), the dispersion of mea-
sured TFPR is unequivocally biased upward. Bils et al. (2017) suggest to tackle this issue
by exploiting the intuition that, while without measurement error revenue growth solely
depends on TFPR and input growth (i.e., PsiYsi = TFPRsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si ), the presence
of measurement error introduces spurious correlation between firms’ TFPR and input
growth. Their suggested methodology consists of regressing revenue growth on input
growth, revenue productivity and their interaction. While the interaction term is ex-
pected to be zero if the level of revenue productivity reflects true differences in marginal
products, inverse negative correlation is expected when revenue productivity is a spurious
indicator of true marginal products. This approach allows us to evaluate the fraction of
observed TFPR dispersion reflecting the actual presence of distortions by estimating the
following equation (under the assumption that the measurement error is additive with
respect to the true revenues and inputs and orthogonal to the true marginal product):
∆V Asi = Φ ln ˜TFPRsi + Ψ∆Zsi + Ψ(1− λ) ln ˜TFPRsi∆Zsi +Ds + si,t
where ∆ denotes the annual growth rate from t − 1 to t; Zsi is the composite input
Kαssi (wL
)
si1− αs; ln ˜TFPRsi = (ln ˜TFPRsi,t + ln ˜TFPRsi,t−1)/2, with ln ˜TFPRsi,t =
19Analogous conclusions can be reached by carrying out the tests on the log-TFPR series.
20In Figure 22 we drop the top and the bottom percentile as a robustness to outliers. The variation of
average ln TFPR across percentiles is low and it oscillates between 0.52 and 0.56.
21In ongoing work, Calligaris (2017) extend the analysis of this paper to allow for heterogeneous
markups, finding that, if anything, measured misallocation actually increases.
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lnTFPRsi,t−
∑Ns
i=1
V Asi,t
V As,t
lnTFPRsi,t; Ds is a sector dummy. The parameter λ indicates
the fraction of observed misallocation (i.e. differences in TFPR) reflecting actual input
misallocation. Our estimated value for this fraction is 0.54, suggesting that more than fifty
per cent of our measured misallocation is not driven by measurement error and can thus
be regarded as true misallocation.22 More interesting for us, this fraction is relatively
constant over time (if anything slightly increasing) over our sample period, suggesting
that, although the level of misallocation has to be taken with caution, our discussion
about the trend in misallocation is mostly unaffected by measurement error issues.
9 Productivity, misallocation, and firm characteristics
In order to shed additional light on the relation between exposure to frontier shocks
and misallocation within industries, we now investigate which firm characteristics (“mark-
ers”) are associated with firms being inefficiently sized. We use data from INVIND, which
is described in Section 3. In particular, we consider corporate ownership and manage-
ment, finance, workforce composition, internationalization and innovation, relying on the
following reduced form at the firm level:
ln
TFPRsit
TFPRst
= β0 + β1Xsit + δt + γs + εsit, (6)
where i, s and t refer to firm, sector and year respectively; Xsit is the marker (or vector
of markers) we want to analyze23; δt is a year dummy that captures common shocks to
all firms in a given year; γs is a sector fixed effects controlling for time-invariant sector
characteristics that can influence the effect of the marker on misallocation; εsit is the
error term. This regression relates the a firm’s relative TFPR with the chosen marker (or
vector of markers). Thus, if our estimates point to β1 > (<)0, we can conclude that firms
with larger Xsit are characterized by higher (lower) relative TFPR. It is worth noting how
this econometric specifications allows us to identify correlations, but not causation.
In equation (6) the main variable of interest is marker X. Its coefficient β1 could
be zero in two different scenarios. First, it would be zero if the aggregate allocation of
resources were efficient (that is, if TFPRis/TFPRs = 1 holds true for all firms). As we
have seen, this is not the case in our data. Second, even if the allocation of resources
were not efficient, β1 would be zero if X did not directly affect relative TFPR. As in the
end only the second scenario is relevant, we can conclude that a non-zero estimate for β1
reveals that the marker increases misallocation.24 In particular, larger (smaller) values of
the marker are correlated to more misallocation for positive (negative) estimated β1. In
other words, if the estimated β1 is positive, firms with relatively large X are inefficiently
small and should absorb more resources; vice versa, if the estimated β1 is negative, firms
with relatively large X are inefficiently large and should downsize or exit the market.
22 Bils et al. (2017) find that this ratio is 0.23 for the US.
23For robustness, we also enter the markers with a squared term in order to allow for non-linearity.
24In Calligaris et al. (2016) we show that a marker could still be linked to misallocation even if β1 were
zero, if it is related to the dispersion of the residuals of equation (6). We have checked whether this is
the case and found no evidence, which implies that β1 6= 0 is the necessary and sufficient condition for
a marker to induce misallocation. We omit these results for parsimony but they are available from the
authors on request.
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Our benchmark specification is based on standard pooled OLS regression, always
including sector and year dummies. In fact, with respect to our aim of investigating the
markers of misallocation, the most appropriate specification does not include firm fixed
effects. Indeed, we are mainly interested in how cross-firm differences in relative TFPR
are related to given firm characteristics; we are less concerned with the effects of the
within-firm variation in those characteristics across time.25
For each marker, we run regression (6). Moreover, following HK, we quantify the firm-
level output and capital distortions (“wedges”) and we use them as alternative dependent
variables in (6).26 In order to interpret the regressions, it is important to keep in mind
that capital and labor distortions are each other’s mirror image, as a high labor distortion
would show up as a low capital distortion. A positive and significant coefficient of the
capital wedge on marker X reveals that X is associated to higher capital distortion relative
to labor (without implying that labor distortion is zero), so that capital compensation is
too low relative to labor compensation, given the output elasticities of these two factors.
A negative and significant coefficient means instead that firms characterised by marker X
tend to suffer from high labor distortion relative to capital, so that labor compensations
are too low relative to capital. Similarly, the output wedge is large when the labor share
is small given the industry elasticity of output with respect to labor.
Therefore, we run regression (6) using as dependent variable not only relative TFPR,
but also the output wedge and the capital wedge. The independent variables (“markers”)
we use refer to a series of usual suspects that include various proxies for ownership, finance,
labor force, innovation, foreign exposure, and cronysm.27
9.1 Corporate ownership/control and governance
We construct an indicator of ownership type, distinguishing between firms controlled
by an individual or a family, a conglomerate, a financial institution, the public sector
or a foreign entity. As Michelacci and Schivardi (2013) already found that family firms
tend to choose activities with a lower risk/return profile compared to firms controlled by
other entities, we expect family firms to have lower relative productivity and thus to be
inefficiently over-resourced with respect to other firms. This is exactly what we find by
regressing the relative TFPR on dummies for each ownership type, using family controlled
firms as the reference group (Table 7).
25 We have also run a number of different specifications, including additional controls, lagged regressors,
and firm effects. Moreover, we have run these regressions by geographic area, firm size, and low- vs.
high-tech sectors using the OECD classification of manufacturing industries according to their global
technological intensity (based on R&D expenditures with respect to value added). While the corresponding
results are available upon request, for parsimony we provide here a synthetic description of the most robust
and policy relevant findings based on the benchmark case with our aggregate sample.
26HK show that, for firm i in sector s, the capital and output distortions (‘wedges’) can be computed
as τKsi = αswLsi/ [(1− αs) RKsi]− 1 and τY si = 1− σwLsi / [(1− σ)(1− αs)PsiYsi], respectively. w is
wage, R is rental rate of capital, Pis is price of output and αs is the capital share of firm expenditures.
27In order to check if our results are driven by the financial crisis, we run all regressions also up to 2008
only. Results are very similar qualitatively, quantitatively, and in terms of statistical significance. The
only difference is for the regression on delocalisation, whose coefficient turns to be statistically significant,
but very similar in magnitude.
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Specifically, we find that firms controlled by either a financial institution, a group,
or a foreign company have between 3% and 8% higher relative TFPR than family con-
trolled firms (column 1). Differently, we do not find any statistical difference of relative
TFPR between public and family controlled firms. This implies that for instance for-
eign controlled firms are too small and should be allocated more resources than family
owned firms. Column 2 of Table 7 confirms this finding by showing that these types of
firms suffer from higher output distortion with respect to family owned firms. Moreover,
column 3 highlights that these firms specifically suffer from an additional distortion in
terms of capital-labor ratio. In particular the negative coefficient implies that they suffer
more strongly of labor distortions and they should increase the labor compensation with
respect to capital, i.e. absorb a higher share of workers.
Reading these findings through the lenses of the HK framework, they imply that
aggregate productivity would likely increase if family firms and government controlled
firms were acquired by private groups or foreign entities. On the other hand, keeping
corporate ownership unchanged, aggregate productivity would increase if misallocation
were reduced within all corporate ownership categories with the largest productivity gains
coming from firms controlled by groups and foreign entities.28
9.2 Finance
We investigate in Table 8 the importance of credit constraints, equity emissions and
relational banking. We also explore in Table 9 the impact of the introduction of the Euro
on firms’ financial characteristics.
Credit constraints
We define credit constrained firms as those that declared that they would have liked
a higher level of debt (Table 8, Panel A). We also use an alternative measure of credit
constraint based on the willingness of having more credit even at higher interest rates,
which delivers the same results.29 Both measures enter the regression with a lag in order
to mitigate endogeneity. In this way we capture how being credit constrained at time
t− 1 is correlated to TFPR and misallocation at time t.
In particular, we find that firms that are credit constrained at time t − 1 tend to
have lower relative TFPR at time t.30 This implies that credit constrained firms are
absorbing too many resources and should downsize (or exit the market), so in this sense
the “right” firms seem to be financially constrained. Moreover, Column 2 shows that
credit constrained firms are characterized by a negative and significant output distortion;
this is equivalent to saying that these firms are actually receiving an implicit subsidy, so
28Although the database is not representative in terms of young firms, we looked at the relationship
between age and relative TFPR. We did not find any significant relationship when only linear terms are
considered. Things seem to change substantially when we allow for a squared term. In that case, our
regression results suggest that the relation between relative TFPR and age are U-shaped. Unfortunately,
the nature of our database prevents us from performing a robust analysis of other aspects of governance.
29Results available upon request
30This effect is particularly pervasive in low-tech industries.
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it would be more efficient if they exited the market. Finally, in credit-constrained firms
the capital-labor ratio is not significantly distorted.
Equity
In Panel B we look at the relation of firms’ relative TFPR and the timing of their
equity emissions. In particular, we look at the correlation between relative TFPR at time
t and equity emissions at time t − 1, t, and t + 1. We report results for time t only, but
there is virtually no difference with the other timings. We find that firms that have lower
relative TFPR in a given year tend to issue more equity (either in the same year, the year
after or the one before). This may suggest that equity issuance may be a relevant source
of funding when firms are hit by a negative productivity shock. This calls for further
investigation about the allocative efficiency of different sources of external funding, such
as equity, bonds, and bank credit.
Relational banking
We consider a firm as being involved in ‘relational banking’ if it declares that the
principal reason for dealing with its main bank is “personal relationship and assistance”.
In Panel C we observe that relational banking is associate with lower relative TFPR,
so that the firms that engage in relational banking are larger than what they should
optimally be. This suggests that relational banking might be a key motivation for low
productive firms to choose a specific bank, perhaps because it grants more support in
time of need. Hence, relational banking may be a drag on aggregate productivity because
it diverts resources from more productive firms with weak banking connections to less
productive firms with strong banking connections.
Euro effect
An important issue about the effect of the Euro on productivity and misallocation
relates to the interest rate convergence that characterised peripheral countries thanks
to the common currency. The traditional argument, as in Gopinath et al. (2015) and
Benigno and Fornaro (2014), is that the availability of cheaper funds led to a misallocation
of capital towards low productive firms that rather than exiting the market increased
their leverage. We do not provide a formal test of this hypothesis, but we look for
observationally consistent facts. If this were the case, we should observe a significant
increase in leverage for firms with lower relative TFPR after the introduction of the
Euro.31 We check if, after the introduction of the Euro, the correlation between TFPR
and leverage has changed.
In Table 9, Column 1, we see that high leverage indeed characterizes lower TPFR
firms. This relation becomes significantly stronger after national exchange rate parities
were fixed to the Euro in 1999. This is consistent with the assumption that the inter-
est rate convergence that followed the introduction of the Euro led to a misallocation
31Leverage is defined as debt over total assets. By looking at this variable we check if firms’ debt
increased disproportionately with respect to total assets during the period of cheap credit that followed
the introduction of the Euro.
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of credit to less productive firms that are disproportionately large given their produc-
tivity. Of course, this evidence is only suggestive and cannot be taken as causal. First,
both TFPR and leverage are co-determined, so we are simply measuring the change in a
correlation. Second, the result does not hold when we look at labor and capital wedges
separately (Columns 2 and 3): not surprisingly, more leveraged firms are characterised
by a misallocation of the capital-labor ratio as the share of capital is too large. However,
this effect did not increase significantly after the Euro.
9.3 Workforce composition
The functioning of the labor market is one of the structural features of the Italian
economy that has been more extensively reformed since the 1990s.32 Misallocation is
less likely to emerge when less productive firms are free to reduce (and more productive
firms are free to increase) the amount of labor. In this perspective, by introducing more
flexibility in the labor market, the reforms that the Italian economy underwent in the 1990s
should have induced a better allocation of labor. In this section we analyse the relation
between firms’ workforce and misallocation from different perspectives. In particular we
consider: the Italian Wage Supplementation Scheme, which is the main instrument of
labor hoarding that firms use, the shares of temporary and foreign workers that firms
hire, the skill intensity among blue- and white-collars. Results are reported in Table 10.
Wage Supplementation Scheme (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni - CIG)
Firstly, we look at how intensively firms resorted to the Wage Supplementation
Scheme (“Cassa Integrazione Guadagni” - CIG). This scheme allows distressed firms to
hoard labor, so that workers suspend temporarily their job or reduce the hours of work
and receive an income supplement from the government. The worker receives the benefit
as long as he remains employed by the firm. We define the variable Wage Supplemen-
tation Scheme as hours paid by the supplementation scheme over total hours paid. The
key characteristic of CIG is that it protects not only the worker, but also the specific job
match between worker and firm. Thus, it can have either a positive or negative effect on
misallocation, because it facilitates labor hoarding guaranteeing to firms and workers a
useful buffer in downturns, but at the same time it might end up protecting a job match
that would be more efficient to break. Our methodology allows us to understand in which
direction productivity and misallocation are affected by this specific policy tool.
32Two major reforms of the labor market took place: the Treu Law and the Biagi Law. The former
was introduced in 1997 (law 196/97) with the aim of making the Italian labor market more flexible. The
main novelty of the Treu Law consisted in the introduction of temporary contracts and in the creation of
Temporary Work Agencies (jobcenters were privatized and decentralized). The Treu Package also modified
the discipline of fixed-term contracts, modified the regulation related to employment in the research sector
and rose from 22 to 24 the age limit for apprenticeship contracts. The Biagi Law, introduced in 2003 (law
30/03), created new contractual forms and renovated some existing ones, mainly affecting the subordinated
workers.
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Panel A of Table 10 shows that the firms that use the CIG more intensively are largely
over-resourced and their size should be smaller than what it currently is. There is also a
positive and significant correlation with output distortion implying that these firms are
receiving an implicit subsidy, which is indeed the case. Finally, our results show that, as
it might be expected, firms using the CIG suffer from a larger labor distortion relative to
capital.
These findings support the idea that less productive firms are more likely to take
advantage of the CIG and that, through the associated (temporary) reduction in labor
costs, the CIG works against the reduction of the amount of labor used by low productivity
firms, thereby fostering misallocation especially on the labor side.33
Temporary workers
Panel B analyzes the relation between temporary workers and misallocation. We
define “Temporary employment share” as the ratio of the number of temporary employees
to the total number of employees at the end of the year. We find that firms that use a
higher share of temporary workers have higher relative TFPR, so they are inefficiently
under-resourced and their size should be larger than what it actually is.34 At the same
time, these firms suffer from a significantly stronger distortion on capital inputs relative to
labor (while we do not find a significant association with output distortions). A possible
explanation could be that more productive firms find stronger distortions in the capital
market and, given the complementarity between capital and labor, they tend to respond
favoring a higher share of temporary and more flexible workers.
Skill intensity
We consider two measures of skill-intensity: the share of white collars holding a degree
(Panel C) and the share of blue collars holding a degree (Panel D). We are able to observe
these two variables only in 2010 and 2011, thereby we run a cross-section regression for
the two years together.35
Firms with a higher share of high skilled workers among white collars have higher
TFPR on average, hence they should be allocated more inputs to increase their size.36
These firms suffer also from a large output distortion and from a relatively larger distortion
for labor relative to capital, where the labor distortion could be related to both skilled and
unskilled labor. However, if we look at the share of skilled workers among blue collars,
we do not find any significant association with misallocation or output distortion, but
33To go more into the details of these relationships, we run contemporaneous and one-year lagged fixed
effects regressions, always finding that the decision to start using CIG is associated with lower relative
TFPR.
34These findings support the idea that higher TFPR firms are more likely to take the opportunity of
resorting to temporary work. This result is in sharp contrast with Daveri and Parisi (2015), who find
a negative correlation between a firm’s share of workers in a temporary contract and its productivity.
However, the different productivity measure and the different time period (2001–2003 in their case) may
explain the difference.
35We also run the regressions for the two years separately and the results are similar.
36This result is particularly strong for big firms and for low-tech firms.
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only a marginally significant association with stronger distortions in labor input relative
to capital.
9.4 Internationalisation
We study the correlation of misallocation with two main dimensions of firms’ inter-
nationalisation: delocalisation and foreign direct investment (FDI). In Table 11 we report
in both cases no evidence of resource misallocation for firms engaging with these types
of international activities with respect to those that do not (we use dummy variables).
Notice that this result does not imply the absence of misallocation within those groups.
However, this is an aspect that, given the low number of observations, we are not able to
analyse.
Another stylized fact about productivity and internationalisation is the well-known
higher productivity of the exporting firms, as compared to non-exporters. Given the
nature of our sample, in which more than 80% of the firms export, we have to somehow
take this evidence for granted. We have nonetheless considered the intensity of the export
activity, measured in terms of the export share of revenues, finding some evidence of a
positive relationship with relative TFPR.37
9.5 Innovation
Innovation is a fairly reasonable marker of both productivity and misallocation. The
relationship can in principle go both ways. On the one hand, innovation can be thought
to foster productivity; on the other hand, more productive firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003)
and/or firms with higher revenues (e.g. Bustos, 2011) can display a higher propensity to
innovate. If the innovation choice is made in a dynamic context with adjustment costs for
capital, a positive relationship with misallocation can be expected (Asker et al., 2014). To
investigate the role of innovation, we consider the share of intangible assets (associated,
essentially, with R&D, marketing and branding) on firms’ total assets. While our database
does not allow us to address innovation using alternative and more focused measures,
relying on intangibles is consistent with Battisti et al. (2015), who show intangible assets
to be positively associated with both TFP and technology adoption at the firm-level.
Table 12 shows that a higher share of intangible assets is associated with higher
relative TFPR.38 This implies that firms that invest more in innovation tend to be under-
resourced and should have larger size. Moreover, these firms tend to suffer from a larger
distortion in the allocation of capital relative to labor. This is consistent with the view
that credit provision to firms that innovate may play a key role in reducing misallocation.
37The variability in the data does not allow for a proper analysis of this issue. Given the low variability
in the data, the relationship emerges only when controls are introduced for the export share in t − 1
and t + 1, or when the nonlinearity in the relationship is taken into account. Results are available upon
request.
38We also enter the regressor with a lag and the results are very similar.
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9.6 Combining markers: a short horse-race
We complete our investigation of the firm markers associated with relative produc-
tivity and misallocation by running the regressions on different subsets of independent
variables entered simultaneously. This should give some guidance on the relative im-
portance of these variables. More specifically, we look at the share of graduates among
white collars, innovation, family ownership, reliance on the wage supplementation scheme
(CIG), and the share of temporary employment. We focus on variables that are avail-
able over subsequent years and are consistently part of our panel and not just of some
year-specific cross-section. Although there might be concern of collinearity between the
variables, cross-correlations are never above 0.27 (in absolute value).
Table 13 summarises the main results. As some of the variables are dummies (i.e.
“family ownership”), whereas the others are continuous variables, comparing the mag-
nitude of the coefficients is difficult. Hence, we focus more on their relative statistical
significance. The results show that the share of graduates among white collars and the use
of the wage supplementation scheme (CIG) are the statistically most significant markers
of misallocation, although of opposite sign (firms with a high share of graduates are too
small and those using the CIG are too large). Family ownership and, to some extent,
innovation are also two significant markers with opposite signs. However, the share of
temporary workers loses significance with respect to the results presented in Table 10. In
terms of output distortion, the most significant markers are again the share of graduates
among white collars, which has a positive and significant coefficient (implying an implicit
tax), and the use of CIG, which has a negative and significant coefficient (implying an
implicit subsidy). Finally, in terms of the capital-labor ratio, innovative and family-owned
firms are the ones with the strongest distortion in terms of capital, whereas firms with
a higher share of white-collar graduates confirm to suffer from a significant distortion in
terms of labor.
These findings, in particular the strong significance of the share of graduates among
white collars and the CIG, can be interpreted as two sides of the same coin. The share
of high-skill employees among white collars drives firm technological and organizational
innovation, which in turn increases firm productivity relative to competitors. In an effi-
cient process of creative destruction labor should seamlessly flow from firms with falling
relative productivity to firms with rising relative productivity thereby enhancing aggre-
gate productivity. This process of efficient reallocation is impaired if firms with falling
relative productivity can use the wage supplementation scheme to keep them afloat when
faced not only with contingent problems (as in the original spirit of the CIG) but also
with structural problems (as in the consolidated practice of the CIG).
More generally, our findings on the importance of the different markers suggest that
firms more likely to keep up with the technological frontier are inefficiently small and thus
under-resourced. These are the firms that employ a larger share of graduates and invest
more in intangible assets. On the contrary, firms less likely to keep up are inefficiently
large and thus over-resourced. These are the firms that have a large share of workers
under a wage supplementation scheme, that are family managed, and that are financially
constrained. We interpret this pattern as evidence that rising within-industry misalloca-
tion is consistent with an increase in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to firms due
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to their heterogeneous ability to respond to sectoral “frontier shocks” in the presence of
sluggish reallocation of resources.
10 Conclusions and policy implications
We have provided a detailed analysis of the patterns of misallocation in Italy since the
early 1990s. In particular, we have shown that the extent of misallocation has substantially
increased since 1995, and that this increase can account for a large fraction of the Italian
productivity slowdown since then. We have shown that the increase in misallocation has
mainly risen within than between sectors, increasing more within those in which the world
technological frontier has expanded faster.
We have highlighted that rising misallocation has hit firm categories that tradition-
ally are the spearhead of the Italian economy, in particular firms in the Northwest and
big firms. We have argued that relative specialization in sectors where the world techno-
logical frontier has expanded faster helps explaining the patterns of misallocation across
geographical areas and firm size classes. The broader lesson is that part of the explanation
of the recent productivity puzzle in other advanced economies may lie in a generalised
growing difficulty of reallocating resources between firms in sectors where technology has
been changing faster rather than between sectors with different speeds of technological
change.
We have shed additional light on the relation between exposure to “frontier shocks”
and misallocation within industries by investigating which firm characteristics are as-
sociated with firms being inefficiently sized. We found evidence that inefficiently small
under-resourced firms are those that, by employing a larger share of graduates and in-
vesting more in intangible assets, are more likely to be keeping up with the technological
frontier. Vice versa, inefficiently over-resourced firms are those that, being featuring larger
shares of workers under wage supplementation, more family managers and stricter finan-
cial constraints, are more likely to be falling behind the technological frontier. We have
interpreted this pattern as evidence consistent with rising within-industry misallocation
being associated with increasing volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to firms due to their
heterogeneous ability to respond to sectoral “frontier shocks” in the presence of sluggish
reallocation of resources.
Beyond Italian specificities, several of these implications may apply more broadly to
other advanced economies facing their own “productivity puzzles”.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Value Added Capital Cost of labor Obs.
Textile and leather 1,265 969 802 249,000
10.92% 8.86% 10.91% 16%
Paper 1,342 1,410 834 127,000
5.93% 6.6% 5.81% 8.2%
Chemicals 2,990 3,138 1,769 138,000
14.36% 15.96% 13.38% 8.9%
Minerals 1,790 2,451 1,075 96,000
5.97% 8.65% 5.65% 6.2%
Metals 1,426 1,436 909 319,000
15.81% 16.86% 15.88% 20.5%
Machinery 2,092 1,276 1,398 390,000
28.3% 18.29% 29.79% 25.1%
Vehicles 4,405 4,884 3,177 51,800
7.93% 9.31% 9.01% 3.3%
Food + tobacco 1,994 2,693 1,102 137,000
9.48% 13.56% 8.25% 8.8%
Wood 807 1,109 520 46,800
1.31% 1.91% 1.33% 3%
Note: CERVED database. Main variables expressed both in absolute values and in per-
centages of the total. Absolute values are expressed in thousand of 2007 Euros.
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Table 2: Summary statistics by geographic area and size.
Value Added Capital Cost of labor Obs.
Panel A: by geographic area
Northwest 2,438 2,175 1,559 592,000
50.1% 47.35% 50.49% 38.1%
Northeast 1,921 1,689 1,196 416,000
27.71% 25.81% 27.19% 26.8%
Center 1,403 1,222 894 294,000
14.3% 13.2% 14.36% 18.9%
South and Islands 896 1,462 574 253,000
7.86% 13.6% 7.93% 16.3%
Panel B: by firm size
Micro 267 263 193 902,000
8.37% 8.73% 9.51% 58%
Small 1,224 1,117 816 471,000
20.01% 19.34% 21.01% 30.3%
Medium 4,950 4,613 3,105 148,000
25.48% 25.15% 25.17% 9.5%
Big 39,400 37,700 24,000 33,700
46.14% 46.78% 44.31% 2.2%
Note: CERVED database. Main variables expressed both in absolute values and in per-
centages of the total. Absolute values are expressed in thousand of 2007 Euros. Firms dived
into four geographic areas and four firms sizes.
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Table 3: Percentages of firms in each sector, by geographic area and size.
Northwest Northeast Center South & Islands Micro Small Medium Big Tot.
Textile and leather 4.6% 3.4% 5.1% 2.9% 9.2% 5.0% 1.5% 0.2% 16.0%
28.6% 21.0% 32.2% 18.2% 57.4% 31.5% 9.7% 1.4% 100%
Paper 3.4% 1.8% 2.0% 1.1% 5.7% 1.9% 0.5% 0.1% 8.2%
41.1% 21.5% 24.6% 12.8% 69.7% 22.9% 6.2% 1.3% 100%
Chemicals 4.3% 2.1% 1.3% 1.2% 4.2% 3.1% 1.2% 0.4% 8.9%
48.4% 23.9% 14.8% 12.9% 47.6% 34.6% 13.8% 4.1% 100%
Minerals 1.3% 1.7% 1.4% 1.7% 3.5% 2.0% 0.5% 0.1% 6.2%
21.7% 27.7% 22.9% 27.8% 57.5% 32.0% 8.7% 1.8% 100%
Metals 9.0% 5.7% 2.9% 3.0% 12.8% 5.9% 1.5% 0.3% 20.5%
43.6% 27.7% 14.0% 14.7% 62.4% 28.9% 7.1% 1.5% 100%
Machinery 11.4% 8.0% 3.3% 2.3% 14.1% 7.9% 2.5% 0.5% 25.1%
45.6% 31.9% 13.3% 9.2% 56.4% 31.5% 9.9% 2.2% 100%
Vehicles 1.3% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 1.8% 1.0% 0.4% 0.1% 3.3%
38.2% 22.8% 18.4% 20.5% 54.6% 28.9% 12.3% 4.2% 100%
Food and tobacco 2.1% 2.3% 1.6% 2.8% 4.6% 2.7% 1.2% 0.3% 8.8%
24.2% 26.4% 17.8% 31.6% 52.0% 30.5% 13.6% 3.9% 100%
Wood 0.7% 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 2.0% 0.8% 0.2% 0.0% 3.0%
24.2% 33.3% 20.4% 22.2% 65.6% 28.2% 5.7% 0.5% 100%
Tot. 38.1% 26.7% 18.9% 16.3% 58.0% 30.3% 9.5% 2.2% 100%
Note: CERVED database. Percentages of firms in each group. Firms dived into four geographic areas and four firms sizes. For each
sector, the first line reports the group percentage with respect to the whole manufacturing, while the second one the percentage with
respect to the specific sector.
Table 4: Value added shares of firms in each geographic area, by size.
Micro Small Medium Big Tot.
Northwest 6.4% 17.5% 24.1% 52.0% 100.0%
Northeast 7.9% 21.7% 29.2% 41.2% 100.0%
Center 11.5% 21.7% 22.8% 44.0% 100.0%
South & Islands 18.3% 25.9% 25.2% 30.5% 100.0%
Note: CERVED database. Value added shares of firms in each group. Firms
dived into four geographic areas and four firms sizes. For each geographic area,
reported the group percentage with respect to the specific size class.
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Table 5: Value added shares of firms in size class, by geographic area.
Northwest Northeast Center South & Islands Tot.
Micro 37.6% 26.0% 19.4% 17.0% 100.0%
Small 43.6% 30.5% 15.6% 10.3% 100.0%
Medium 47.2% 32.1% 12.8% 7.8% 100.0%
Big 56.1% 25.0% 13.7% 5.2% 100.0%
Note: CERVED database. Value added shares of firms in each group. Firms dived into four
geographic areas and four firms sizes. For each size class, reported the group percentage with
respect to each geographic area.
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Table 6: Unit root tests on relative TFPR
Test Statistic p-value
Im-Pesaran-Shin Statistic p-value
W-t-bar (a) -17.2958 0.0000
W-t-bar (b) * -63.9714 0.0000
Fisher-type, Augmented DickeyFuller (c)
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 5901.691 0.0000
Inverse normal -8.8742 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8669) -13.9079 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 29.0925 0.0000
Fisher-type, Augmented DickeyFuller (c) *
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 6539.15 0.0000
Inverse normal -12.8297 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8599) -19.645 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 36.7378 0.0000
Fisher-type, PhillipsPerron (d)
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 7465.222 0.0000
Inverse normal -21.5148 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8639) -29.4953 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 47.8446 0.0000
Fisher-type, PhillipsPerron (d) *
Inverse chi-squared(degrees of fr. 3476) 8073.704 0.0000
Inverse normal -26.0377 0.0000
Inverse logit t(degrees of fr. 8614) -35.8587 0.0000
Modified inv. chi-squared 55.1425 0.0000
*Trend included
Serially correlated errors:
(a) 1.03 lags - chosen by AIC;
(b) 1.72 lags - chosen by AIC;
(c) 1 lag Augmented Dickey-Fuller;
(d) 1 lag Newey-West.
Note: The null hypothesis states that the estimated coefficient φis
in the following autoregressive model is equal to zero for all firms:
∆ ln
TFPRis,t
TFPRs,t
= φis ln
TFPRis,t−1
TFPRs,t−1
+ D’is,tγis + is,t. Dis,t represents a
firm fixed-effect in the standard cases and includes a linear time trend in
the cases indicated with asterisk; is,t is independently distributed normal
for all i and t and is allowed to have heterogeneous variances across firms.
The alternative hypothesis is that φˆis 6= 0 for a fraction of firms. We
assume errors to be serially correlated. We let the routine chose the lag in
the Im-Pesaran-Shin test, while we set the lag to one in the Fisher-type
test.
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Table 7: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative TFPR Relative TFPR Output Wedge Output Wedge Capital Wedge Capital Wedge
Family -0.0526*** - -0.0346*** - 0.209*** -
(0.0125) (0.00532) (0.0262)
Conglomerate 0.0582*** 0.0417*** -0.219***
(0.0147) (0.00593) (0.0291)
Financial Institution 0.0308* 0.0159* -0.133***
(0.0183) (0.00812) (0.0368)
Government -0.0237 -0.0169 -0.250***
(0.0326) (0.0160) (0.0547)
Foreign 0.0803*** 0.0498*** -0.238***
(0.0176) (0.00681) (0.0369)
Constant 0.107 0.0647 5.415*** 5.388*** 5.094*** 5.299***
(0.221) (0.219) (0.0464) (0.0456) (0.465) (0.469)
Observations 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420 17,420
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.098 0.102 0.293 0.294
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on ownership dummies. Specifically, Family is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is controlled by an individual or a family, Conglomerate is equal to 1 if controlled by a non-financial corporation, Financial Institution by a financial institution,
Government by a public institution, Foreign by foreign entity. The sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees over the years 1987-2011. All
regressions include year and two-digit sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1, 5 and 10%
respectively.
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Table 8: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Finance
(1) (2) (3)
Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Panel A:
Credit Constraint -0.0657** -0.0322** -0.00445
(0.0298) (0.0157) (0.0485)
Observations 1,188 1,188 1,188
R-squared 0.155 0.132 0.375
Panel B:
Increased equity -0.0629*** -0.0305*** 0.000297
(0.0151) (0.00801) (0.0276)
Observations 9,527 9,527 9,527
R-squared 0.035 0.076 0.255
Panel C:
Relational banking -0.0823** -0.0202 -0.0273
(0.0336) (0.0257) (0.0600)
Observations 774 774 774
R-squared 0.080 0.148 0.335
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on indicators of
financial conditions. Each panel report a separate set of regressions. Credit constraint is the lagged value
of a dummy equal to 1 if the firm declared that, at the current borrowing conditions in terms of interest
rate and collateral, the firm would prefer a higher level of debt from banks or other financial institutions.
Increased equity is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm increased equity in the current year. Relational
banging is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm declares that the principal reason for dealing with its main
bank is “personal relationship and assistance”. The sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50
employees over the years 1989-2011 in Panel A, 1998-2011 in Panel B and 2002 in Panel C. Regressions
in Panel A and B include year and two-digit sector fixed effects; regression in Panel C includes two-digit
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the
1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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Table 9: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Euro effect
(1) (2) (3)
Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Leverage -0.381*** -0.0303 -0.979***
(0.0663) (0.0353) (0.133)
Post99 -0.0206 0.105*** -0.260***
(0.0240) (0.0157) (0.0430)
Leverage*Post99 -0.197** -0.0708 0.176
(0.0966) (0.0460) (0.175)
Constant 0.0574*** 5.468*** 5.613***
(0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0352)
Observations 15,633 15,633 15,633
R-squared 0.037 0.119 0.314
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on Leverage, defined
as debt over total assets, Post, which is a dummy equal to 1 for years after 1999, and their interaction. The
sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees over the years 1987-2007. All regressions
include two-digit sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate
significant at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.
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Table 10: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Workforce composition
(1) (2) (3)
Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Panel A:
Wage supplementation -0.425*** -0.165*** -0.515***
(0.0979) (0.0432) (0.0740)
Observations 19,078 19,078 19,078
R-squared 0.041 0.106 0.283
Panel B:
Temporary employment, share 0.116** -0.0398 0.597***
(0.0565) (0.0280) (0.120)
Observations 11,825 11,825 11,825
R-squared 0.028 0.072 0.246
Panel C:
Graduate share, white collars 0.359*** 0.105*** -0.241*
(0.0765) (0.0308) (0.133)
Observations 1,412 1,412 1,412
R-squared 0.080 0.152 0.279
Panel D:
Graduate share, blue collar -0.234 -0.159 -1.092*
(0.421) (0.412) (0.571)
Observations 1,366 1,366 1,366
R-squared 0.059 0.143 0.278
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on indicators of
financial conditions. Each panel report a separate set of regressions. Wage supplementation is hours paid
by the Government wage supplementation scheme over total hours worked. Temporary employment, share
is the number of temporary employees over total number of employees. Graduate share, white collars is
the number of graduate white collar over total number of white collar workers, and similarly for blue collar
workers. The sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees over the years 1987-2011 in
Panel A, 1999-2011 in Panel B, 2000 and 2010 in Panel C and in Panel D. Regressions in Panel A and B
include year and two-digit sector fixed effects; regressions in Panel C and D include two-digit sector fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1, 5 and
10% respectively.
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Table 11: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Internationalisation
(1) (2) (3)
Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Panel A:
Delocalisation -0.00715 -0.000137 -0.0313
(0.0386) (0.0114) (0.0709)
Observations 655 655 655
R-squared 0.109 0.203 0.295
Panel B:
FDI 0.00640 -0.0137 0.0772
(0.0585) (0.0196) (0.115)
Observations 201 201 201
R-squared 0.304 0.399 0.463
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on indicators of
Internationalization. Each panel report a separate set of regressions. Delocalization is a dummy equal to
1 if the firm delocalized part of its production activity. FDI is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has engaged
in FDI. The sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees. Panel A is a cross-section
for the year 2011, and Panel B is a cross-section for 2003. All regressions include two-digit sector fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1,5 and 10%
respectively.
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Table 12: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: Innovation
(1) (2) (3)
Relative TFPR Output Wedge Capital Wedge
Intangible assets share 0.144*** -0.00188 0.377***
(0.0381) (0.0160) (0.0688)
Constant -0.0796 5.377*** 4.849***
(0.176) (0.110) (0.398)
Observations 11,689 11,689 11,689
R-squared 0.030 0.071 0.247
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on the share of
intangible assets over total assets. The sample includes manufacturing firms with at least 50 employees
over the years 1999-2011. All regressions include year and two-digit sector fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1,5 and 10% respectively.
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Table 13: Firm-level ‘markers’ of misallocation: a short horse race
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relative TFPR Relative TFPR Output Wedge Output Wedge Capital Wedge Capital Wedge
Graduate share, white collars 0.350*** 0.313*** 0.0854** 0.0747** -0.229* -0.269**
(0.0746) (0.0736) (0.0336) (0.0353) (0.128) (0.129)
Intangible assets share 0.0855 0.139* -0.0265 -0.00886 0.571*** 0.609***
(0.0753) (0.0720) (0.0351) (0.0348) (0.143) (0.141)
Family -0.0527** -0.0619** -0.0154 -0.0182 0.179*** 0.169***
(0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0491) (0.0488)
Wage supplementation -0.782*** -0.279*** -0.393
(0.141) (0.0784) (0.244)
Temporary employment, share 0.169 0.0179 0.423*
(0.130) (0.0436) (0.233)
Constant -0.00547 0.0228 5.537*** 5.554*** 5.331*** 5.286***
(0.377) (0.306) (0.0390) (0.0215) (0.742) (0.712)
Observations 1,290 1,289 1,290 1,289 1,290 1,289
R-squared 0.101 0.131 0.158 0.170 0.315 0.319
Note: the table reports OLS regressions of relative TFPR, output and capital wedges on a selected set of variables from the previous tables. Graduate share, white
collars is the number of graduate white collar over total number of white collar workers, Intangible assets, share is the share of intangible assets over total assets, Family
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is controlled by an individual or a family, Wage supplementation is hours paid by the Government wage supplementation scheme
over total hours worked, Temporary employment, share is the number of temporary employees over total number of employees. The sample includes manufacturing
firms with at least 50 employees over the years 2000 and 2010. All regressions include year and two-digit sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
sectoral level. ***,**,* indicate significant at the 1,5 and 10% respectively.
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Figure 1: Evolution of TFP since the global financial crisis (2007=100)
Source: Conference Board.
Figure 2: Contribution to value added growth, Italy
Source: EU-Klems.
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Figure 3: TFP in manufacturing for Italy, Germany and France (2005=100)
Source: Hassan and Ottaviano (2013).
Figure 4: Evolution of TFPR average and variance (1993-2013)
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Figure 5: Distribution of TFPR, 1995, 2007 and 2013
Source: CERVED.
Figure 6: Evolution of aggregate misallocation, 1993-2013
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Figure 7: Misallocation, within vs. between categories
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Source: CERVED. The figure reports a decomposition exercise of the dispersion of ln TFPR within and
between each of the three categories (geographic area, industry and size class). The values are computed
over the whole 1993–2013 period.
Figure 8: Evolution of within-misallocation by category
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Source: CERVED. The figure reports the evolution of the within component of the variance of ln TFPR,
by category.
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Figure 9: Evolution of between-misallocation by category
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Source: CERVED. The figure reports the evolution of the between component of the variance of ln TFPR,
by category.
Figure 10: Evolution of misallocation, balanced vs. full-sample (1993=100)
Source: CERVED.
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Figure 11: Evolution of misallocation, marginal product of capital and labor
(1993=100)
Source: CERVED.
Figure 12: Misallocation by geographic area
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Figure 13: Misallocation by firm size
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Figure 14: Change in R&D intensity and misallocation at the sectoral level
Source: CERVED and OECD. The figure reports the correlation between the change of misallocation and
R&D intensity at the 2-digit sectoral level. The change in misallocation is computed between 2013 and
1993. The change in research intensity is measured by taking the difference between the period 1993-2007
and 1987-1992. R&D intensity is measured as the share of R&D expenditure on value added.
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Figure 15: Productivity ratio of firms’ entry and exit with respect to sectoral
averages
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Source: CERVED and OECD.
Figure 16: Dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
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Source: CERVED. The figure reports the evolution of the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
constructed as the residuals of a regression of TFPR on firm fixed effects, sector-year fixed effects and
lagged TFPR. See the main text for the details.
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Figure 17: Exit rate by productivity decile
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Source: CERVED. The figure shows the share of firms that exit the market for each decile of firms’
productivity in specific years.
Figure 18: Productivity gains from equalising TFPR dispersion to its 1995
value, manufacturing
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Figure 19: Productivity gains from equalising TFPR dispersion to its 1995
value, by firm size
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Source: CERVED.
Figure 20: Productivity gains from equalising TFPR dispersion to its 1995
value, by geographic area
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Figure 21: Variance Ratio Statistics (stationarity of relative TFPR)
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Source: CERVED. Variance Ratio of relative lnTFPR defined as V ar(Xt+k −Xt)/V ar(Xt+1 −Xt), with
X denoting the average value of ln TFPRsit
TFPRst
.
Figure 22: Ln TFPR by the percentile of firm size
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Appendix
A Defining Misallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
In this Appendix we review the main framework of HK, highlighting the main concepts
and measurers of misallocation. From standard profit maximisation, we know that firms
choose the amount of capital K and labour L by equalising the marginal revenue product
(MRP) of each input to its marginal cost. While this process yields marginal revenue
product of capital (MRPK) and marginal revenue product of labour (MRPL) equalisation
across firms when all firms face the same input cost, the presence of market distortions
can drive ‘wedges’ between MRPK and MRPL across firms. In this case, we say that
capital and labour are ‘misallocated’ across firms.
To see this, let us start with a standard Cobb-Douglas technology with sector-specific
production coefficients
Ysi = AsiK
αs
si L
1−αs
si , (7)
and follow HK in denoting distortions that increase the marginal products of capital
and labour by the same proportion (‘output distortions’) by τYsi , and distortions that raise
the marginal product of capital relative to labour (‘capital distortions’) by τKsi . From the
FOC of firm i, active in sector s, we have that
MRPKsi = Psi
∂Y˜si
∂Ksi
= αsPsi
Ysi
Ksi
= W˜K (8)
and
MRPLsi = Psi
∂Y˜si
∂Lsi
= (1− αs)Psi Ysi
Lsi
= WL (9)
with Y˜si = (1− τYsi )Ysi and W˜K = (1− τKsi )R, where R and WL refer to rental and wage
rates of capital and labour respectively.
If τYsi = τ
K
si = 0 ∀i ∈ s, firms face the same inputs costs and the MRP of the
two inputs is equalized across them. In this case, capital and labour are efficiently allo-
cated. When this happens, the within-sector distributions of MRPK and MRPL exhibit
zero dispersion around the mean, as the average MRPK in sector s (MRPKs) equals
MRPKsi ∀i ∈ s (and analogously for MRPL). No misallocation emerges in this case.
Note that the MRP equalisation condition holds independently of the way in which
firms set Psi, that is, independently of market structure, the only condition being the
absence of distortions in capital and labour markets.
A.1 A measure of misallocation
Since the higher the dispersion the larger are the distortions, it would be relatively easy
to investigate the presence, and the magnitude, of resource misallocation by looking at
the within-industry dispersion of MRPK and MRPL. However, if one is interested in the
aggregate effects of those distortions, more structure is needed.
To this aim, a useful strategy is suggested by HK, whose approach allow us to study
the effect of misallocation on aggregate TFP. The intuition is quite simple and rests on
the proportionality between firm TFP and MRP of inputs. In particular, using (7), it is
possible to write firm i’s TFP as
TFPsi = Asi =
Ysi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
. (10)
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As statistical information on either physical output Ysi or firm price Psi is hardly available
(see. e.g., Foster et al., 2008), TFP is usually calculated/estimated on the basis of firms’
revenues. In particular, by (10) we have
TFPRsi = PsiAsi =
PsiYsi
Kαssi L
1−αs
si
. (11)
While using TFPRsi instead of TFPsi usually represents a shortcoming, this is not
the case for the HK framework. The reason is that, under specific assumptions on market
structure, TFPRsi can be shown to be unaffected by firm-specific characteristics other
than the distortions τYsi and τ
K
si . In particular, if each sector s is monopolistically com-
petitive, firms set prices according to the markup rule
Psi =
σ
σ − 1βs(W
K)αs(WL)1−αs
(1 + τKsi )
αs
(1− τYsi )
1
Asi
, (12)
where σσ−1 is the markup and βs = α
−αs
s (1−αs)αs−1 is the bundle of parameters associated
with the Cobb-Douglas production function (7). Note that, apart from Asi, the only firm-
specific terms in (12) are the distortions. When substituted into (11), the pricing rule in
(12) yields
TFPRsi =
σ
σ − 1βs(W
K)αs(WL)1−αs
(1 + τKsi )
αs
(1− τYsi )
. (13)
According to (13), also the cross-firm variability of TFPRsi is not influenced by firm-
specific characteristics other than τKsi and τ
Y
si (as the term Asi cancels out). Moreover, HK
show that it is proportional to the weighted geometric average of MRPKsi and MRPLsi,
with weights given by the Cobb-Douglas parameters:
TFPRsi ∝ (MRPKsi)αs(MRPLsi)1−αs ∝ (1 + τ
K
si )
αs
(1− τYsi )
. (14)
As a result, the extent of misallocation can be studied by looking at the dispersion of the
TFPRsi distribution, instead of considering the distributions of MRPKsi and MRPLsi.
A.2 Misallocation, aggregate TFP and aggregate gains from eliminating
misallocation
The usefulness of this approach stems from the fact that it is relatively easy to sum up
across firms and obtain a measure of the aggregate TFP loss due to misallocation. To see
this, assume that the economy produces a single homogeneous final good Y by combining
the output Ys of the S manufacturing industries in a Cobb-Douglas fashion:
Y =
S∏
s=1
Y θss =
S∏
s=1
(
AsK
αs
s L
1−αs
s
)θs
, with
S∑
s=1
θs = 1 (15)
where Ks =
∑
iKsi and Ls =
∑
i Lsi are the total stocks of capital and labour used
in sector s, the industry output Ys is a CES aggregate of Ms horizontally differentiated
products Ys =
(∑Ms
i=1 Y
σ−1
σ
si
) σ
σ−1
, and the sectoral TFP is defined as
As =
[
Ms∑
i=1
(
Asi
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] 1σ−1
, (16)
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with TFPRs referring to the weighted geometric average of average MRPK and av-
erage MRPL in the sector (i.e. TFPRs ∝ (MRPKs)αs(MRPLs)1−αs).
According to (16), without misallocation, aggregate TFP is a CES aggregation of
individual TFP. Otherwise, a TFP loss will emerge in the aggregate.
The relationship between TFPs and the dispersion of TFPsi can be made more explicit
by assuming that the distributions of TFP and TFPR are jointly lognormally distributed.
In this case, HK show that
lnTFPs =
1
σ − 1 ln
(∑
i
Aσ−1si
)
− σ
2
var(lnTFPRsi). (17)
Finally, the ratio Y/Y ∗ in Equation (5) can be expressed as a weighted geometric
average of the sectoral ratios of observed to efficient TFP levels As/A
∗
s across sectors,
with each sector’s weight given by its share θs of aggregate output (value added):
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Y
Y ∗
=
S∏
s=1
(
As
A∗s
)θs
=
S∏
s=1
[
Ns∑
i=1
(
Asi
A∗s
TFPRs
TFPRsi
)σ−1] θsσ−1
, (18)
where Ns is the number of firms in sector s and σ is the elasticity of demand (which
we set equal to 3 as in HK). Notice that equation (18) implies that the output ra-
tio Y/Y ∗ equals the ratio of observed to efficient aggregate TFP levels TFP/TFP ∗ =∏S
s=1(As)
θs/
∏S
s=1(A
∗
s)
θs .
39Following HK, we assume that the sectoral share θs is constant over time, which is the case if one
assumes that aggregate output is a Cobb-Douglas composite of sectoral outputs.
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